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Abstract 
 An examination of the case Oliver v. The Maryland Insurance Company, 7 
Cranch 487 (1813). In Oliver, Robert Oliver, the plaintiff, sued the Maryland Insurance 
Company, the defendant, in an attempt to recover on an insurance policy he had 
purchased for a shipment of goods aboard the snow Comet. The Comet was seized by a 
British ship on its return from Spain, and was condemned under the Orders in Council of 
1807. The Court affirmed a lower court judgment that Oliver was not entitled to recover, 
because the Comet had engaged in an unreasonable delay and deviation on its return 
voyage that voided the insurance contract. Livingston and Marshall both filed opinions; 
Livingston claiming that the Comet’s delay in Barcelona for 4 months constituted the 
allotted time for a reasonable delay, and the further deviation to the nearby port of Salou 
was therefore unreasonable, even though it was the usage and custom of trade at 
Barcelona. Chief Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion, stating his opinion that the 
jury should have determined whether the Comet’s delay was caused by a reasonable 
apprehension of fear due to “Algerine” privateers in the area; and if the jury found this 
reasonable apprehension existed, he would have held the deviation excused. An 
examination of the principle of deviation law as it stands today shows the importance of 
the Court’s decision in Oliver and shows how the Court’s holding provided for the 
soundest precedent for courts, merchants, and marine insurers to rely on through the 
present.   
Disciplines 
 Maritime History, Prize Law, Marine Insurance, Napoleonic Wars,   
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Part I: The Case 
Facts of the Case: 
 In 1807, the snow Comet, owned by wealthy Baltimore merchant Robert Oliver, 
shipped out of Baltimore for Barcelona. Oliver had taken out an insurance policy on the 
ship from the Maryland Insurance Company, a Baltimore insurance company of which 
Oliver coincidentally also had an ownership interest.1 The insurance policy specifically 
insured the Comet only “at and from Baltimore to Barcelona and at and from thence back 
to Baltimore.” 2 The ship and her crew sailed into Barcelona on July 25th, 1807, and port 
officials there deemed it necessary to place the ship in quarantine. She was not unloaded 
and ready to sail on until November 28th, 1807.3 On this date, the Comet departed 
Barcelona for the port city of Salou, sixty miles south of Barcelona, to take on cargo for 
the return trip to Baltimore.4 Again, the insurance policy strictly covered merely sailing 
from Baltimore to Barcelona and back.  
 During the trip to Salou, crew on board the Comet were informed that “Algerine 
cruiserz (sic),” were in the area and had been capturing American ships.5 “Algerine 
cruiserz” referred to privateers dispatched by the regency of the Barbary states located in 
Algiers, which had a history of harassing and kidnapping the crews of American 
merchant ships in the area and holding them in exchange for ransom payments from the 
young American government. Because they were advised to stay and wait for more 
information, the ship did not sail for Salou until January 8th, and they arrived to the port 
                                                 
1 Oliver v. Maryland Insurance Co., 11 U.S. 487, 7 Cranch 487, 489 (1813) 
2 Oliver, 7 Cranch 487 at 489 (1813) 
3 Id.  
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
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on the tenth.6 Once there, weather forced the Comet to remain in Salou until January 
28th, 1808, when she finally departed for Baltimore.7 On February 5th, 1808, a British 
ship blockading Europe captured the Comet, and carried her back to Gibraltar. There, a 
British admiralty court adjudicated the prize under the Orders of Council of 1807, and 
condemned the ship as a lawful prize.8 
Procedural History 
 After the seizure of the Comet, Oliver brought this action to recover on his 
insurance policy. The Judiciary Act of 1789, as well as Article III, Section 1 of the 
Constitution, placed original jurisdiction with the federal district court in admiralty 
actions such as this.9  Both Oliver and the defendant Maryland Insurance Company were 
domiciled within Maryland for the purposes of federal jurisdiction; as such, the trial 
began in the federal district court for the District of Maryland. 
 At trial, attorneys representing the defendants asked the trial judge to instruct the 
jury that Oliver could not recover for his insurance policy, because of the extended stay 
of the Comet in Barcelona.10 However, the trial judge instructed the jury differently, 
telling the members of the jury that Oliver could only recover on the policy if the entirety 
                                                 
6 Id. 
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 U.S. Const. art. III, §1 establishes that the judicial power of the United States, in 
addition to resting with the Supreme Court, also rests with “such inferior courts as 
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The “Judiciary Act of 1789,” in 
sections 2 and 3, established the District Court of Maryland. An Act to Establish the 
Judicial Courts of the United States, Pub. L. No. 1-20, §§2, 3, I Stat. 10, 73 (1789). These 
District Courts were then granted original jurisdiction over civil cases in admiralty and 
maritime law by the same Act of Congress. Curiously, the Act also stated that the jury 
were the triers of issues of fact in all cases except admiralty and maritime jurisdiction-an 
issue integrally tied to the disposition of Oliver. An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts 
of the United States, Pub. L. No. 1-20, §9, I Stat. 10, 76-77 (1789).  
10 Oliver, 7 Cranch 487 at 489, infra (1813).  
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of the testimony convinced the jury that the Comet was not in Barcelona longer than “the 
usage and custom of trade at that place rendered necessary to complete her cargo.”11 
Oliver’s attorney objected to this instruction. However, the trial and appellate level courts 
did not examine the exception very thoroughly, and favored the instruction that Oliver 
could only recover if the Comet had stayed in Barcelona according to the usage and 
custom of the trade. The Supreme Court found no “principle to which he [Oliver’s 
lawyer] could rightly object,” so his exception was also not adopted by the Court; instead, 
they examined the judge’s instructions about the usage and custom of the trade at 
Barcelona described above.12  
 In addition, the attorneys for the Maryland Insurance Company pressed the judge 
to instruct the jury that if they found that the Comet deviated from her course in order to 
sail to Salou, then Oliver could not recover on his insurance claim, even if the Comet 
only stayed in Barcelona for as long as the “usage and custom of trade” allowed.13 The 
trial judge accepted this argument, and so instructed the jury that the ship “could not 
afterwards go to another port and take [her cargo] in without violating the policy.” 14  
 At trial, both the plaintiff and defendant offered testimony arguing, respectively, 
that usage and custom and trade justified the delays in the Comet’s voyage or that the 
delays represented an unwarranted deviation. As support for Oliver’s position, attorneys 
for the plaintiff offered evidence that ships sailing into Barcelona ordinarily stayed in that 
port until the return cargo they needed could be collected at a nearby port like Salou, and 
then they went on to sail to that port not as a deviation but as a necessary step to collect 
                                                 
11 Id. at 489-490. 
12 Id. at 490. 
13 Id. at 490-491 
14 Id. at 491. 
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their cargo.15 On the other hand, the Maryland Insurance Company argued that evidence 
from the crew of the Comet, as well as the British sentence of condemnation against the 
Comet, showed that the ship’s cargo was all loaded by November 28th, and she was 
ready to sail on December 1st.16 Thus, the insurers argued, the Comet made an 
unnecessary delay in staying in Barcelona over a month after her cargo was readied, and 
if the jury accepted these facts, the defendants argued, then the plaintiffs could not 
recover under the insurance policy.17 The trial judge accepted this argument and 
instructed the jury accordingly; the trial court, at the Circuit Court level for the District of 
Maryland, then found the defendant Maryland Insurance Company not liable under the 
policy, and the plaintiff Oliver appealed.18 
 Robert Goodloe Harper was the attorney representing Robert Oliver before the 
Supreme Court.19 His argument for the Plaintiff was centered on two premises: that the 
Comet was entitled to remain at Barcelona for the length of time it did and then sail on to 
Salou under the normal usage and custom of trade in Barcelona; and that even if the 
Court did not find the Comet’s stay was justified under the usage and custom of trade, the 
ship’s delay was still justified until the threats of seizure by vessels from Algiers had 
passed.20  
 William Pinkney and Luther Martin made up the legal team representing the 
Maryland Insurance Company before the Supreme Court.21 In reply to Harper’s 
                                                 
15 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 492 (1813). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 487-488. 
19 Id. 
20 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 488 (1813). 
21 Id.  
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argument, they argued that the Plaintiff could not produce enough evidence to show that 
the Comet relied on a “reasonable apprehension” of danger from seizure by ships based in 
Algiers, and that such a determination was a matter of law to be decided by the Supreme 
Court.22 To this point, Harper replied that the “reasonable apprehension” determination 
was a question of fact that must be decided by a jury, or was such a blended question of 
law and fact that it was still properly decided by a jury, not the Court.23 Finally, Martin 
and Pinkney advanced the argument that furthermore, the deviation in the trip to Salou, 
contrary to the language in the policy Oliver had taken out on the Comet, was not 
justified by “usage and custom of trade,” and thus the ship was not covered by the policy 
because of this deviation.24 
Opinion of the Court 
 The Supreme Court’s opinion is broken down into three parts: the majority 
opinion, by Chief Justice Marshall, a concurrence, by Justice Livingston, joined by 
Justice Story, and a brief reply to this concurrence, written again by the Chief Justice.25 
Two justices, Justice Washington and Justice Todd, were missing from the Court’s 
opinion.26 The Chief Justice’s opinion adopted the position that, “If the Comet remained 
without excuse at Barcelona an unnecessary length of time while her cargo was ready for 
her and she might have sailed, she would remain at the risk of the owners-not of the 
underwriters.”27 Furthermore, Marshall’s opinion set forth that if it was the usage of the 
                                                 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 489, 493, 495-496.  
26 Id. at 487. 
27 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 490 (1813) (emphasis added) 
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trade for ships in Barcelona to touch at Salou, then this would not place liability with the 
ship owners.28  
 However, on this point Marshall had to acknowledge that the majority came to a 
different conclusion, as the majority considered the delay at Barcelona and the travel to 
Salou “not as independent but as auxiliary usages which are to be taken in connexion 
(sic) in ascertaining whether there was or was not unreasonable delay in the conduct of 
the voyage.”29 The difference of opinion between Marshall’s opinion and the holding of 
the Court is summed up when Marshall describes how the Court held that “the delay 
necessary for [taking in its cargo] at either port,” but that because the Comet spent all the 
time allotted to her under the usage of trade of Barcelona in the port there, “the 
subsequent delay at another port, for the purpose of taking in the cargo, must be 
considered as unreasonable.”30 Marshall’s opinion makes it clear that, because the Court 
believed that the Comet exhausted all her allotted time for delay while in Barcelona, 
Oliver was not entitled to recover when the ship deviated from the insurance policy by 
sailing to Salou; however, if the ship had not stayed in Barcelona as long, then the 
deviation might have still been covered under the policy.31 
 Next, Marshall’s opinion turned its focus to the danger faced by the Comet from 
privateers in the Mediterranean asserted by the plaintiff Oliver.32 Marshall held that a 
reasonable apprehension of danger of capture by ships from Algiers was justifiable, but 
only if the apprehension was not “a mere general danger, indefinite in its application and 
                                                 
28 Id. at 491. 
29 Id.  
30 Id.  
31 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 491-492 (1813) 
32 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 493 (1813) 
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locality.”33 The danger, Marshall said, had to be specific and definite to the 
circumstances surrounding the Comet at that time, and in this case, Marshall found it was 
not “shown that there was any danger in proceeding from Barcelona to Salou.”34 Thus, 
Marshall’s opinion upheld the judgment of the Circuit Court holding that the Maryland 
Insurance Company was not liable on the policy to Oliver.35 
 In his opinion, Justice Livingston agreed that the judgment of the Circuit court, 
holding that the Maryland Insurance Company did not owe payment on the policy to 
Robert Oliver, was correct.36 However, Livingston’s justification for this holding relied 
on slightly different grounds than Marshall’s justification. Livingston claimed only to be 
examining the issue of whether the Comet was justified in not sailing for Salou until 
January of 1808, when she was cleared to sail on December 1st, 1807, because of fear of 
capture by ships from Algiers.37 Livingston justifies this belief that the matter is a 
question of law by saying that the Court is best positioned to make judgments like this, so 
that it will create a coherent body of law that is easier for shipping merchants to 
understand.38 
 Justice Livingston’s opinion had the effect of compartmentalizing the spheres of 
the jury and the court in deciding questions of law and fact during maritime insurance 
cases. He held that the best holding for effective maritime commerce and shipping would 
be to confine the jury solely to questions of fact in cases like these, where questions of 
whether a delay was justifiable arose. Also, his opinion clearly stated his view that a 
                                                 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id.  
37 Id. at 494.  
38 Id. at 495. 
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question of justifiable delay should not be a mixed one of law and fact, as doing so would 
allow the jury to encroach on the area of the law traditionally under the purview of the 
judge.39  
Specifically, Livingston found that the determination of whether an act had been 
performed during the time required under the law to allow a party to claim an action for 
that act was a determination to be made entirely by the court.40 Finally, upon this point 
Livingston held that he “entirely concur[red]” with the judgment of the Circuit Court and 
Marshall’s opinion that, examining the Plaintiff’s claims as a question of law, the delay 
of the Comet out of fear of “Algerine cruizers” was not justifiable to entitle relief on the 
policy.41 Justice Story joined Justice Livingston’s concurrence without adding any further 
opinion of his own.42 No information exists in the official Court record of the case to 
indicate that Justice Marshall and Duvall had any other opinions on the case, so 
presumably they joined Marshall’s original opinion of the Court. However, they are not 
listed as having joined Marshall’s final addendum, where he explained the ways in which 
his opinion diverged from that of the rest of the Court. Therefore, Justices Marshall and 
Duvall joined the judgment of the Court, and agreed that the Maryland Insurance 
Company could not be held liable for Oliver’s claims.  
 Finally, Chief Justice Marshall wrote a brief addendum explaining his differences 
from the opinion of the rest of the Court, stating that he would have left it up to the jury 
to determine whether there was danger between Barcelona and Salou, and he would have 
                                                 
39 Oliver, infra, 7 Cranch 487 at 495.  
40 Id.  
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
 10 
“instructed that if there was danger that it justified the delay, otherwise not.”43 This 
practice of multiple opinions by written by justices in such a back and forth manner is not 
seen on the Court today, but in early cases of the United States Supreme Court (and 
others), it was not all that uncommon, and was a practice of English judges as well. In 
this way, Chief Justice Marshall’s parting sentences in this case highlight where he  
Part II: Historical Context of Oliver v. Maryland Insurance Company 
Prize Law 
 At the time Oliver v. the Maryland Insurance Company was decided in 1813, 
prize law was a well-established area of the law. As one writer has described it, “the laws 
controlling prize taking were as familiar to the American populace [of the 18th and 19th 
centuries] as the rules of baseball are today.”44 Prize cases involved several different 
elements, but all began with a portion called the “chase,” where the prize-taking vessel 
(the “predator”) attempted to catch up to its intended prize and compel her to “bring too” 
or stop, so she could be inspected.45 From there, the British (and most other countries of 
the time) usually tried prize cases in their own courts, as it was their firm belief that 
“prize cases be tried on the soil of the captor’s nation.”46 In prize cases, courts decided 
whether the capture was a good prize or not, and then sold the ship and the cargo, with 
proceeds going to valid claims from neutral claimants (usually those who owned neutral 
cargo on board) and then to the capturing crew.47 
                                                 
43 Id. at 495. 
44 Donald A. Petrie, The Prize Game: Lawful Looting in the Days of Fighting Sail, 2 
(1999).  
45 Id., 147-148. 
46 Id., 154.  
47 Id., 159-161.  
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 Normally, neutrality of ships was highly respected by all powers involved in prize 
law. However, there were three major exceptions that a capturing party could use to 
overcome a claim of neutrality from a captured ship: “the right to halt and inspect, the 
right to confiscate military supplies (contraband) intended for the enemy, and the right to 
blockade.”48 These were important exceptions in many cases, and especially so in Oliver 
v. the Maryland Insurance Company. The case record does not disclose what type of 
cargo was aboard the Comet; however, she was intended for Barcelona and Salou, two 
ports in Spain that were under the auxiliary control of Napoleon’s empire around the time 
the Comet shipped out.49 Indeed, as discussed in more depth below, the context of the 
Napoleonic War is crucial to understanding the events of Oliver. Partly because of this 
context, it would seem reasonable that the British could have believed a ship headed from 
the European Continent could be carrying contraband. 
 However, the exception for the right to blockade is the more important concern in 
the case of the Comet. In 1806 and 1807, Britain passed a series of “Orders in Council,” 
restricting trade with Napoleon’s French Empire.50 Specifically, this British legislation, 
in effect a paper blockade, hurt American shipping, as it “prohibited neutral trade with 
Napoleonic Europe except under [British] license,” and many American merchants 
understandably did not want the complex issues involved with applying for these British 
licenses.51 This is the exception to neutral trade that the British ship that captured the 
Comet presumably relied on to justify the capture. The Comet was a neutral ship, trading 
                                                 
48 Id, 162.  
49 Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism. Ed. Carl Cavanagh Hodge. Westport, 
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2008. Pg. 551 
50 British Orders in Council, 1807 
51 Muir, Rory. Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon, 1807-1815. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1996. Pg. 232. 
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with the enemy, Napoleonic France, right around the time Britain passed the Orders in 
Council. Most likely, the Comet did not have the required licenses to engage in this trade, 
and under Britain’s laws, therefore, she was subject to the blockade and could be 
captured as good prize despite its neutrality.   
Napoleonic Wars 
 As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, the seizure of the Comet took place 
during a heightened time of international conflict. Great Britain and France, along with 
other European nations, were embroiled in the height of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Specifically, Napoleon’s reliance on the Continental system as a way of waging 
economic warfare on Britain, combined with Britain’s subsequent issuance of the Orders 
in Council, directly affected neutral American shipping to European nations.52 Along 
with these economic phases of the war, though, heightened actual conflict was taking 
place, as Napoleon began the Peninsular War on the Iberian Peninsula in the early 1800s 
as well.53 
 Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal in 1807, as a punishment for Portugal’s lack of 
acquiescence in Napoleon’s Continental System, sparked the Peninsular War.54 At first, 
Spain complied with Napoleon’s request to invade Portugal; however, he quickly grew 
tired of Spain’s feeble and uninspired assistance in his invasion.55 As a result, Napoleon 
replaced Spain’s ruler with his own brother, Joseph, and was fully embroiled in a war 
with Britain and her allies on the Iberian Peninsula by 1808.56 In the context of 
                                                 
52 Id., 232-233. 
53 Hodge, Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism, supra, 551.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
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examining these events at the time of the Comet’s capture, it is clear that the Comet 
shipped out to ports that were at the very least friendly to Napoleon’s French Empire. It 
also is reasonable to conclude some of the goods on the Comet could have gone to 
supplying Napoleon’s armies potentially moving across the Iberian Peninsula to invade 
Portugal, as the invasion took place in the same year as the Comet’s voyage.  
 In fact, American merchants frequently took advantage of the wartime climate of 
this time to make significant sums of money. Warring European nations were constantly 
demanding American wheat in order to feed their massive armies. Baltimore at this time 
was rising to prominence as a global shipping center, primarily due to the presence of 
large-scale wheat production in the areas surrounding the city.57 As Bruchey wrote, “The 
war-born demand [stemming from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars] 
encouraged the ‘milling interests’ of Baltimore and its environs, and the manufacture of 
flour increased so greatly that after 1795 it largely replaced wheat in the city’s exports.”58 
Furthermore, Great Britain in 1807 and 1809 was a large importer of Baltimore flour 
exports, and “French armies in the Iberian Peninsula accounted for the primacy of Spain 
and Portugal from 1810 through 1813.”59 Thus, it is quite obvious that during the period 
Oliver’s cargo shipped out on the Comet, Napoleon’s armies and Britain’s armies were 
large-scale consumers of grain shipped from the Baltimore area and provided much 
incentive for Baltimore merchants to ignore any blockade announcements and ship to the 
fighting nations.  
                                                 
57 Stuart Weems Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant of Baltimore, 1783-1819, 102 (1956).  
58 Id. at 103 (citing Scharf, Chronicles of Baltimore, at 277).  
59 Id. at 104 (citing statistics from Pitkin, A Statistical View, at 97 and 119-20) 
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 Between the Orders In Council of 1807, Napoleon’s various pronouncements of 
his Continental system, and the enormous opportunities afforded by the Peninsular War, 
Baltimore merchants such as Robert Oliver faced a complicated balancing of interests in 
determining whether to continue to ship to Europe.  Furthermore, the United States had 
itself issued an embargo in 1807, which also nominally restricted American merchants’ 
ability to trade.60 
“Algerine Cruizers” 
 The “Algerine cruizers” as they were described in the case record, represented an 
important threat to American ships in the Mediterranean Sea in the early nineteenth 
century. In 1795, the United States was forced to pay the government in Algiers over $1 
million for the release of captives that had been taken from American vessels and held in 
captivity for a decade.61 The privateering states along the North African coast continued 
to demand tribute from the American government in return for promises to not seize 
American ships; by 1800, the young government was expending a fifth of its revenue on 
these tributes.62  
 With Jefferson’s election in 1800, the American government’s attitude towards 
these pirates changed from one of appeasement to one of aggression. In the early years of 
the 19th century’s first decade, Jefferson increased the American naval presence in the 
Mediterranean, and American naval ships defended merchant ships from attacks by 
                                                 
60 Sherry H. Olson, Baltimore: The Building of an American City, Commerce is the 
Mainspring, 46 (Johns Hopkins University Press 1997)  
61 Jack Kenny, “Bane of the Barbary Pirates,” The New American, 35 (American Opinion 
Publishing 2011) 
62 Id. at 37.  
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Barbary Coast pirates.63 By 1805, the tide had turned in America’s favor with the capture 
of an important fortress of one of the Barbary nations, and the Pasha faction agreed to 
sign the Treaty of Peace and Amity, instituting relative safety for American ships in the 
region.64 This is an interesting development when it is considered in the context of 
Oliver’s arguments in Oliver v. the Maryland Insurance Company. Since this treaty was 
signed before the Comet was delayed due to an alleged “reasonable apprehension” of fear 
of Algerine privateers, it seems the argument may have been somewhat disingenuous. 
However, by 1815 the Americans found themselves once again fighting off privateers 
from the North African Barbary states, underscoring the instability of the peace signed in 
1805. Furthermore, in 1807 Algerine ships had violated the treaty and seized three 
American ships (the Mary Ann, the Violet, and the Eagle) because the United States was 
two years behind on its tribute payments.65 
 Perhaps, then, only the crew of the Comet will ever truly know how “reasonable” 
their apprehension of the Barbary pirates was on their journey to Salou. However, since 
Oliver was unable to produce significant evidence that pointed to a specific threat posed 
by these forces, it appears the Court’s judgment was fair that the Comet had not claimed 
any specifically defined reasonable apprehension to excuse its deviation.  
Marine Insurance 
 Marine Insurance was, and still is, an important device for merchants to ensure 
their cargo against certain losses that can happen on the high seas. Obviously more 
important in the time of prize law and piracy, maritime insurance frequently covers 
                                                 
63 Id. at 38.  
64 Id. at 39.  
65 Frederick C. Leiner, The End of Barbary Terror: America’s 1815 War against the 
Pirates of North Africa 21 (Oxford University Press, 2006) 
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insured shippers from losses suffered by capture of cargo. However, as with every other 
type of insurance, a few exceptions can nullify an insurer’s liability under maritime 
policies.  
 Deviation is one such exception, as there is an implied policy of a “doctrine of no 
deviation” common to marine insurance contracts.66 Under the common law definition, 
was “a ‘voluntary departure, without necessary or reasonable cause, from the regular and 
usual course’ of a voyage.”67 Deviation was “rooted in the marine insurance law” of 
“both American and British maritime law” very early on in the common law system, and 
certainly earlier than many of the statutes that govern the area of law today.68 
Specifically, the doctrine has been described as the idea that, “a marine underwriter was 
deemed to have contracted only for the risks inherent to the expeditious prosecution of 
the voyage by the agreed or customary route.”69 A deviation of the ship from the route 
described in the insurance contract therefore invalidated any maritime insurance 
contract.70 In addition, “such a deviation amounted to a repudiation,” meaning that not 
only was the insurer no longer liable on the ship’s insurance; it was also not liable for any 
insurance contract on the cargo of the ship.71 
 This deviation doctrine, releasing insurers from liability when insured ships went 
away from the agreed-upon course of travel, rested on principles from contract and tort 
                                                 
66 William D. Winter, Marine Insurance: Its Principles and Practice, 168 (McGraw Hill 
Book Company 1952, 3rd Ed.) 
67 Margaret M. Lennon, Deviation Then and Now: When COGSA’s Per-Package 
Limitation is Lost, 76 St. John’s Law Review 437, 437 (2002) (citing Hostetter v. Park, 
137 U.S. 30, 40 (1890)) 
68 Theodora Nikaki, The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine, 35 J. Mar. L & Com. 45, 45 (January 
2004) 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 
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law before its statutory enactment.72 The contract law justification for releasing the 
maritime insurer lay in the fact that a specific contract had been drawn up between the 
insurer and the owners of the insured ship.73 This contract only covered the ship for a 
very specific and detailed trip; therefore, when the ship made a deviation from the 
charted and contracted course, it was creating a new course.74 As no contract existed 
between the owners of the insured ship and the insurer covering the new course, the 
insurer could not be held liable for claims arising from this new course.75 The tort 
justification lay in the “fundamental wrongdoer principle”: any damages incurred by a 
deviation could not be held to have occurred had the deviation not occurred, and 
therefore the insurer could not be held liable for these damages.76 
 Applying the deviation doctrine to this case, the Court’s reasoning becomes quite 
clear. The contract between the Maryland Insurance Company and Robert Oliver covered 
the Comet specifically in her travels from Baltimore to Barcelona, and then back.77 When 
the Comet then detoured from that route, and sailed for Salou, a deviation from the 
agreed-upon course occurred. Under this deviation theory, contract law principles 
excused the Maryland Insurance Company from compensating Oliver for the losses, as 
this new course was not covered by his insurance policy. Furthermore, tort law principles 
also supported the Court’s reasoning in this case, as under the “fundamental wrongdoer 
principle,” the fact that the losses suffered by Oliver (namely, losing his ship and its 
cargo as a prize) occurred after the deviation meant that he was liable for those losses, not 
                                                 
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id, 45-46.  
75 Id.  
76 Id., 46.  
77 Oliver, supra, at 487 (1813). 
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the Maryland Insurance Company. By applying the deviation law doctrine common to 
American maritime law at the time, the Court was able to determine that Oliver, not the 
Maryland Insurance Company, should be responsible for the losses incurred due to the 
deviation of the Comet. 
 In light of this doctrine, it also appears that the Court’s determination was 
probably relatively straightforward. The deviation doctrine was a well-established 
principle of maritime law during the period that Oliver was decided. It was seen in not 
only American law, but in the law of the great naval power of the time, Britain, as well.78 
Thus, it would have presumably been well known to a prominent merchant who relied on 
international shipping frequently, such as Oliver, and to the captain of the Comet who 
decided on the deviation in the first place.  
Realistically, the only potential argument Oliver would have (and one that he 
indeed relied upon) was that the deviation was not a true “deviation,” but was actually a 
custom and usage of the trade at Barcelona.79 This would excuse the detour, because it 
would therefore legally still be considered part of the trip to Barcelona and would be 
covered under the specific terms of the insurance contract.80 However, the Court upheld 
the Circuit Court’s determination that the trip to Salou was not the custom and usage of 
the trade at Barcelona.81 As a result of this finding, Oliver effectively had no defense 
against the Maryland Insurance Company’s claim that the Comet’s trip to Salou was a 
deviation, and thus the Court correctly applied the deviation doctrine in finding Oliver, 
                                                 
78 Nikaki, The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine, supra, at 45.  
79 Oliver, supra, at 487 (1813). 
80 Id. and Nikaki, The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine, supra, at 45.  
81 Oliver, supra, at 494 (1813). 
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not the Maryland Insurance Company, liable for the losses incurred by the seizure of the 
Comet. 
The Court also could draw support for its finding of a deviation if it determined 
that the Comet had been unreasonably delayed in its stay at Barcelona. A commonly held 
principle of maritime insurance law that was first articulated in Oliver states that, “an 
unreasonable delay in the voyage [of the ship] that extends the insurer’s liability” will 
release the insurer from liability.82 At the heart of the determination of whether a delay 
was justified was whether the delay was an unreasonable one, or whether it was part of 
the usage and custom of the trade at the port where the delay occurred.83 In marine 
insurance issues today, the “reasonableness or unreasonableness of the delay…is a 
question of fact, determined in the light of all the circumstances surrounding the case.”84 
In this case, the Court determined that the delay caused by extending the ship’s stay at 
Barcelona and sailing to Salou was not reasonable, and the Court examined it as a mixed 
matter of law and fact, not a purely factual issue to be determined by a jury.85 In 
examining the Court’s decision in this light, it becomes clear that it is a straightforward 
application once again of this delay doctrine, and that the Court made the right 
determination here. Even though Chief Justice Marshall appealed for a holding that this 
was a question of fact, Livingston and the rest of the Court agreed that under the common 
law of the time, the determination of the reasonableness of a delay was a question of 
law.86 The majority of the Court led by Livingston here made the prescient point that if 
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the determination of reasonableness was not made by a court, it would be impossible for 
a firm precedent to be set in such a way that merchants could look to the law for 
guidance.87 
Even more authorities, especially some contemporary ones, further support and 
crystallize the Court’s ruling in Oliver. The fact that modern day treatises examining 
insurance law continue to discuss Oliver underscores how important this case continues 
to be in the area of maritime insurance law. Theodora Nikaki in her law review article 
The Quasi-Deviation Doctrine directly cited Oliver before launching into an extensive 
examination of how the deviation doctrine has evolved.88 This evidence of the Oliver 
holding’s impact in modern marine insurance law is important and shows how this 
somewhat complicated, nuanced holding of the Court still holds defining importance 
today in delineating the limits of one of the exceptions to the deviation doctrine.  
Part III: The Litigants and Attorneys Involved 
Robert Oliver: Robert Oliver was born in Northern Ireland in 1757, and emigrated from 
there to Baltimore in 1783, the year the American Revolution ended.89 He came to 
America with “probably little or no money.”90 However, he quickly established on of the 
largest fortunes in the early years of the American Republic; it’s estimated he was worth 
over a million dollars by the early nineteenth century.91 
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 Shortly after his arrival in Baltimore, Oliver began a partnership with a man 
named Simm, who was potentially one of the first investors in Oliver’s business future.92 
Evidence in the historical record suggests that the firm of Oliver & Simm most likely 
began as “commission merchants”; that is, they sold goods others shipped into 
Baltimore.93 Most likely, Oliver came to Baltimore from the city of Belfast, in Northern 
Ireland, and his connections to Ireland and England proved fruitful, as virtually all of the 
early shipments Oliver & Simm important were from cities in England or Ireland.94 
However, Oliver’s partnership with Simm was short-lived, and by early 1785 Oliver was 
doing business on his own and looking for a new partner.95 
 Oliver found that new partner in Hugh Thompson, with whom he founded Oliver 
& Thompson and invested an estimated £4,000 of his own money to help start the 
partnership.96 However, as Bruchey writes, the partnership of Oliver & Thompson served 
as a vehicle for collecting unpaid charges from the old firm of Oliver & Simm and paying 
off unpaid debts to creditors; thus, Oliver’s actual original contribution probably worked 
out to only around £1,000 of his own funds.97 Regardless, it is evident from the ledgers of 
the early years of Oliver & Thompson that Oliver probably possessed very little money of 
his own outside of the business, thus providing even more incentive for the firm to 
diversify its business interests, as it did beginning in the latter half of the 1780s.98 
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 During these post-Revolutionary War years, however, Oliver & Thompson 
struggled with weak markets for their shipments, as did most American merchants of the 
time.99 The British navy, still stinging from the defeat of the American Revolution, kept 
American merchant ships out of British ports throughout the empire, severely dampening 
American exports and causing shippers to resort to illegal methods in an attempt to get 
their goods into British ports.100 During this time, and during the recovery years 
following the economic downturn, Oliver & Thompson stayed afloat by doing most of its 
business in commission sales, which included such tasks as, “selling goods consigned to 
them; guaranteeing the debts arising from sales; tending to the repair and provisioning of 
the vessel which brought them; securing insurance and return freights; and remitting the 
proceeds of sales, in bills and exchange or a return shipment.”101 In addition to the 
significant amount of money the firm was making in commission fees on others’ sales, 
then, Oliver was getting his first taste of maritime insurance. At the time, “Baltimore had 
no chartered company…to insure vessels and property at sea, [so] Oliver & Thompson 
secured insurance in England, from other Baltimore men, or covered the property 
themselves.”102  
 As far as goods that Oliver & Thompson actually shipped on their own behalf 
(that is, their non-commission business), it appears their biggest export was tobacco.103 
The vast majority of the firm’s tobacco exports of this time went to ports in England and 
France, especially Lorient, where Oliver & Thompson shipped tobacco to a 
                                                 
99 Bruchey, Robert Oliver: Merchant of Baltimore, supra, 60-62.  
100 Id, 60-61. 
101 Id, 63.  
 102Id, 65 
103 Id., 68 
 23 
commissioning firm of J.J. Berard & Company.104 However, while the firm invested a 
large amount of its finances in these exports at this time, only very small profits were 
realized from its exports.105 Finally, Oliver & Thompson began the dissolution of their 
partnership in 1796, and the winding up period continued until profits ceased in 1799.106  
 By 1796, Oliver had already set up his partnership with his brothers, through 
which he would continue to amass wealth throughout his lifetime.107 This partnership 
was helped along by the massive funds Oliver was able to invest thanks to the profits he 
realized from the Thompson partnership, as he eventually came into around $160,000 as 
a result of profits from the Thompson partnership.108 Undoubtedly, this large amount of 
initial investment, along with Oliver’s obvious business acumen, led to Oliver’s place as 
the primary director of the Oliver Brothers partnership. Bruchey also extensively 
describes how this profit and Oliver’s rise to the director of Baltimore’s first bank as well 
as “two marine insurance companies” shows Oliver’s growing stature in this business 
world, as well as reflects “the rise…of the city in which he lived.”109 
 The early years of the Oliver Brothers partnership coincided with Baltimore’s rise 
as the primary merchant town in the region.110 This rise was partly perpetuated by the 
French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars, as Bruchey writes that this 
“war-born demand” influenced a large increase in the export of wheat and flour from the 
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Baltimore region.111 This makes sense, as the leaders involved in the struggles between 
the European powers of the time had to rely on massive shipments of flour to help feed 
their growing armies. As these wars became frequent to the point of being nearly constant 
in the late 18th and early 19th century, the demand for flour from the region created a 
growing market for merchants like Oliver. Luckily for these merchants, this boom in 
demand coincided with technological advances in flour milling in areas close to the port 
of Baltimore.112 Thus, merchants had an ample and easily accessible supply to meet the 
expansive demands of the market, and took advantage of it to realize significant profits at 
the time. 
 These profits would prove to be crucial, as they acted as a sort of cushion to help 
soften the blow that felled many Baltimore merchants when a period of peace emerged 
from 1801 to 1803.113 Because of these profits, and most likely because of the residual 
profits Oliver was able to use from his partnership with Thompson to invest in the Oliver 
Brothers partnership, the Oliver Brothers business survived. However, many Baltimore 
merchants of the time were not so lucky; “a hundred Baltimore merchants” had been 
ruined as a result of the peace following the Treaty of Amiens.114 These spectacular 
failures, often caused by risky business ventures, as Oliver noted, led Oliver to lead his 
Oliver Brothers partnership into a more cautious path, investing in more low risk business 
ventures than some of his peers.115 
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 By the time the Comet was seized in 1807, it was obvious that shipping to Europe 
carried with it a more significant risk. This risk was reflected in the Oliver Brothers 
partnership’s shipping activity at the time. In November of 1806, the Olivers lost a 
schooner to British capture (the Rapid).116 During 1806 and into 1807, the Oliver 
Brothers attempted to procure British licenses to trade as neutral vessels, as they 
recognized that a heightened risk of capture existed because of the passage of the Orders 
in Council of 1806 and 1807.117 
 Unfortunately for the Oliver Brothers, they did not receive these licenses in time 
to prevent the seizure of the Comet. However, despite the losses of various ships in the 
years 1806 and 1807 and their failure to obtain licenses that would end the threat of 
capture by the British, the Oliver Brothers partnership still realized a significant profit 
during this period. Indeed, their trade in Spanish gold yielded a net profit of over $1 
million on shipments they made with John Craig using the licenses of one David 
Parish.118 In addition, the profits on their own ships alone grossed them $493,382, despite 
the loss of one of their ships.119 Thus, the Oliver Brothers partnership was still pulling in 
significant enough profits to weather the losses of a few ships. 
 However, by 1808, the Oliver Brothers realized that the changing nature of the 
ongoing European conflict would hamper further profits, and determined finally that it 
was not worth the risk. Thus began the end of their international shipping career and the 
winding up period of their partnership.120 Napoleon’s issuance of the Continental System 
                                                 
116 Bruchey, Robert Oliver, Merchant of Baltimore, supra, 319.  
117 Id., 320-322.  
118 Id., 329.  
119 Id., 332. 
120 Id., 335.  
 26 
decrees, combined with the Orders in Council of 1806 and 1807, presented too much of a 
deterrence for Robert Oliver to consider trade with Europe worth the risk anymore.121 
From the period of the American embargo on trade with Europe in 1809, the Olivers 
began slowly withdrawing from international trade, and most of the profits of the firm 
from that point on were realized on domestic business ventures.122 
 Bruchey writes that, “the most obvious external factor in Oliver’s success was 
American neutrality during the long European wars.”123 This is inescapably true. His vast 
fortune was acquired as a result of his opportunistic trade with colonial European powers 
such as Spain, France, and England. The large demand created by these warring nations 
created an opportunity that a shrewd businessman like Oliver pounced on immediately, 
but in a risk-averse manner at the same time.124 In his later years, the Oliver brothers 
partnership was able to focus on new business ventures in stocks, property interests, and a 
focused interest in insurance, among others.125 From this point on, Oliver lived a more 
quiet life, full of less international renown, until his death in 1834, at the age of 77.126 
Robert Goodloe Harper:  
 Robert Goodloe Harper was the lawyer for Robert Oliver in Oliver v. Maryland 
Insurance Company. He was born in 1765 in Virginia, and moved four years later to 
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South Carolina.127 He moved to Baltimore in the early nineteenth century and established 
a prominent law practice.128 He also served in the War of 1812, as did William Pinkney, 
and was promoted all the way to major general.129 Harper was also a fairly successful 
politician, having been elected a senator from his newly adopted state in 1815; however, 
he later ran unsuccessfully for Vice-President.130 At this point he apparently retired from 
public life, travelling extensively until his death in 1825.131 In this litigation, Harper 
represented Robert Oliver, and was unsuccessful in his attempts to advocate for the 
holding that the reasonableness of the Comet’s delay was a question of fact to be tried by 
a jury, not a question of law to be determined by judges; as such, Oliver lost his claim 
against the Maryland Insurance Company. 
Luther Martin:  
 Luther Martin represented the Maryland Insurance Company in this litigation. 
Martin was most likely born in 1748, and graduated from Princeton at the top of his class 
at the age of nineteen.132 For a few years after college, Martin taught in various schools 
across the Eastern Shore, both in Maryland and Virginia.133 However, this was merely to 
be a stop on his journey to becoming a lawyer. In 1771, Martin was admitted to the bar in 
Virginia, and from there he began a practice on the Eastern Shore, covering counties in 
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Maryland and Virginia.134 He apparently had an affinity for the Eastern Shore, as he also 
lived during this time in Somerset County.135 However, Martin’s aspirations were not 
simply limited to the private practice of law. By 1778, he had been appointed the 
Attorney General of Maryland.136 Furthermore, he was chosen as one of Maryland’s 
delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, where he was a champion for Anti-
Federalist causes and warned against the dangers of a too-powerful central 
government.137 Martin’s political connections and ambitions therefore permeated the 
breadth of his legal career.  
 Martin’s political connections can be seen in his “last great victory,” when he 
defended Aaron Burr against charges of treason.138 In this case, Martin’s legal acumen 
was present as well, since he managed to prevent Burr’s conviction despite being 
described as “awkward, disgusting, coarse, fulsome, gross, crude, and ungrammatical” in 
his advocacy.139 This case took place around the turn of the century, just a few years 
before the Oliver case, and displays some of the legal skills that, while they may have 
been failing by the time of Oliver, were still potent enough to help win the case for the 
Maryland Insurance Company.  
In 1818, Martin was once again appointed the attorney general for Maryland, a 
post in which he argued perhaps his most famous case, McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316 (1819).140 In his capacity as attorney general, however, Martin had to unfortunately 
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represent Maryland, and was on the losing end in this famous case of federalism. Adding 
insult to injury, some of Martin’s own words from the Constitutional Convention, in his 
concessions about federalism, were used by Marshall in his decision in McCulloch.141 
After this case, old age and alcoholism undoubtedly began to catch up with Martin, as did 
his indebtedness. However, Martin was so esteemed as a public figure that Maryland set 
up a fund, supported by taxes on new lawyers that was intended to support Martin until 
his death.142 In addition, Martin’s old friend Aaron Burr took him and supported Martin 
in his older years. Martin died on July 10, 1826, at the age of 78.143 
William Pinkney:  
 Pinkney was another attorney for the Maryland Insurance Company in Oliver v. 
the Maryland Insurance Company. Oddly enough, Pinkney and Martin must have been 
quite a dichotomy in their arguments before the Court in Oliver. Pinkney was born in 
1764 in Annapolis, Maryland.144 He began his legal practice in 1786 in Maryland, and 
had risen so quickly that just two years later he was elected a state delegate to ratify the 
Constitution.145 Just a few years after that, in 1790, Pinkney was elected to Congress, 
launching his political career. 146 As a politician, statesman, and generally a lawyer, 
Pinkney was a somewhat cleaner figure than Martin. He was appointed to England as a 
minister under the terms of Jay’s Treaty, and stayed abroad long enough to sharply 
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criticize the Orders in Council England passed in 1807.147 Justice Marshall apparently 
thought so highly of Pinkney that he called him, “the closest reasoner he had ever 
heard.”148  
Pinkney’s later exploits in life were also slightly more esteemed than Martin’s. 
Pinkney served in the War of 1812, even receiving a grave wound at the Battle of 
Bladensburg while defending Washington, D.C.149 In his later years as a politician, 
Pinkney was even involved in such historical events as defending the Missouri 
Compromise before legislative bodies with Daniel Webster.150 
This picture of Pinkney helps shed some light on the juxtaposition of his character 
and Martin’s character in representing the Maryland Insurance Company before the 
Supreme Court in Oliver. Where Martin covered all broad arguments he could and argued 
with passion and fervor, sometimes fortified by alcohol and sometimes bordering on 
disgusting, Pinkney comes across as a more cool, reserved, and logical advocate before 
the Court.151  However, the image of these two lawyers is somewhat more complicated 
than this dichotomy presented here, as the Life of William Pinkney perhaps casts Pinkney 
as too clean of a character. Robert Ireland describes Pinkney as, “…pompous, vain, 
jealous, abrasive and vindictive,” but goes on to further admit that, “Despite his many 
weaknesses of character, William Pinkney was widely acknowledged to be the foremost 
lawyer of his day.”152 Regardless of the complex characters presented by Martin and 
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Pinkney, the strengths of these two esteemed attorneys and eloquent speakers before the 
Court must have been effective when combined, as they came out victorious in Oliver. 
The Maryland Insurance Company 
On January 12, 1796, the Baltimore newspaper The Federal Gazette published the 
legal document incorporating the Maryland Insurance Company.153  These documents 
showed that the Maryland Insurance Company was fully incorporated by its shareholders 
in 1795.154 On April 6, 1795, Robert Oliver was elected one of the directors of the 
Maryland Insurance Company.155 Both Oliver and his partner in Oliver and Thompson, 
Hugh Thompson, were among the incorporating shareholders listed in the documents of 
incorporation.156 This partly reflects on the friendship between Oliver and Thompson, as 
Bruchey writes that Thompson, even after their partnership, was one of Oliver’s lifelong 
friends.157 Thus, in an odd coincidence, Oliver was suing a company he had helped to 
found and for which he had once served on the board of directors. In fact, he may have 
even still held shares of the Maryland Insurance Company, as it was his practice to 
engage in multiple business ventures; thus, he may have been covered on both sides of 
this litigation. 
The Maryland Insurance Company remained active in prize cases through the 
beginning of the twentieth century, as can be seen from claims the company filed to 
recover on items on the seized schooner Thetis in 1915, as well as a multitude of others 
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during the nineteenth century.158 In 1943, the company was listed on a House document 
relating to the nonapplicability of antitrust laws to insurance companies. However, at this 
time the company was incorporated in Delaware, not Maryland.159 It seems likely, 
therefore, that this was a different company from the original one incorporated by Oliver 
and others in Maryland in the late eighteenth century, which presumably was defunct by 
this time.  
Part IV: Conclusion 
 As mentioned above, this case still holds some precedential value today. It has 
been cited in twenty-two cases, including 3 before the Supreme Court. In addition, it was 
mentioned in two other opinions of the Court.160 A full Shepardization of the case on 
Lexis databases reveals twenty-six decisions that have cited to Oliver. Of these, only one 
is listed as distinguishing from the holding of Oliver; the rest cite to the case or follow it. 
Furthermore, of the four Supreme Court cases that have relied on the Oliver opinion, 
none have a negative indication of the Court’s decision.161 It is therefore evident that the 
Court deemed its own reasoning in this case to be logical precedent, and it has therefore 
been adopted as an important aspect of the canon of marine insurance law.  
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Oliver’s importance is not limited to citations within Supreme Court holdings, 
however, as it is cited in numerous treatises, law review articles, legal dictionaries, and 
other such modern documents that define important terms such as deviation and delay for 
the marine insurance practitioner.162 In conclusion, despite the nuanced and technical 
opinion-which at first glance appears to apply only in specific situations-the central 
holding of Oliver clarified the definitions of the deviation and reasonable delay doctrines, 
and established firm limits on what could be considered a reasonable deviation and delay 
that would not void a marine insurance contract.  
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